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We consider the problem of a monopolist￿ choosing an optimal nonlinear
pricing scheme￿ facing two consumers who can resell some or all of the goods
to each other in a secondary market. We suppose that the valuations of the
consumers are drawn independently from a continuous distribution. We ￿nd
conditions for the optimum direct mechanism and show that the monopolist
can be better o⁄or worse o⁄as compared to the without resale case, depending
on the speci￿cs of the cost function of the monopolist and the utility functions
of the consumers.
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1 Introduction
Consider the adverse selection problem of a transaction between a seller (the monop-
olist,) and buyers (consumers,) where the seller does not perfectly know how much
the buyers are willing to pay for the goods. Suppose also that the seller sets the
terms of the contract￿ i.e. a menu of quantities and prices. The problem of one prin-
cipal facing one agent who has private information about his type was ￿rst analyzed
by Mirrlees (1971). One monopolist and a consumer problem was then analyzed by
Mussa and Rosen (1978), and Maskin and Riley (1984), among others. The reader is
referred to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), La⁄ont and Martimort (2002) and Wilson
(1993) for a detailed discussion of economics of adverse selection.
All previous work on monopolist￿ s problem of optimal nonlinear pricing focused
either on a single consumer or on multiple consumers who cannot resell the goods
to one another, except for Calzolari and Pavan (2006). Calzolari and Pavan (2006)
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1recently consider a monopolist who designs an allocation rule and a disclosure policy
that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. They
consider two consumers with two types of valuations and show that it may be impos-
sible to maximize the revenue with a deterministic selling procedure and disclosing
only the decision to trade. In their model, the monopolist has one unit of the good
at his hand. There is no question of how much to produce.
In this paper, we also consider two consumers who can resell the good to each other
in the secondary market. However, we consider consumers drawing valuations from a
continuous distribution, rather than focusing on a ￿nite set of valuations. In order to
simplify optimal nonlinear pricing problem, we do not consider the disclosure policy of
the monopolist. Speci￿cally, we suppose that the monopolist proposes a deterministic
menu of o⁄ers and no information is revealed after the trade between the monopolist
and the consumers.
We consider two di⁄erent cases of the nonlinear pricing problem. In the ￿rst
model, the monopolist is assumed to have a production technology of constant mar-
ginal cost, and the consumers are assumed to have concave utility functions. This
model was analyzed by Maskin and Riley (1984) for a model without resale, and it
results in quantity discounts, which is widely seen in practice. We ￿nd conditions for
the optimal nonlinear pricing schemes of the model with resale. Moreover, we show
that the maximal revenue achievable in an environment with resale is less than the
maximal revenue achievable in an environment without resale. This follows from the
observation that in an environment without resale, since the utilities of the consumers
are concave, the monopolist can o⁄er a certainty equivalent of the transactions of the
model with resale at a lower price. This result is in line with understanding that
resale is detrimental to monopoly power.
In the second model, the monopolist is assumed to have a convex cost function,
and the consumers are assumed to have linear utility functions. For this model,
the secondary market optimal behavior is easier to characterize. This is because
consumers have linear utility functions and hence announcing a unit price is their
optimal selling procedure in the secondary market.1 This model results in premia
rather than quantity discounts. We characterize the optimal menu for this model and
show that the maximal revenue achievable in an environment with resale is more than
the maximal revenue achievable in an environment without resale. This follows from
the observation that in an environment with resale, by o⁄ering the same quantities
as in without resale optimal menu, the monopolist can demand higher amounts of
monetary transfers from the consumers. This result runs counter to understanding
that resale is detrimental to monopoly power.
We therefore conclude that the pro￿tability of banning the resale (if the monop-
olist has a power to do so) depends on the speci￿cs of the environment. If the utility
functions of the consumers are concave, then the monopolist can gain by o⁄ering
1Whereas in the ￿rst model, the consumers o⁄er a nonlinear menu of quantities and prices to
each other in the secondary market.
2a certainty equivalent of the transactions in the secondary market. Therefore, the
model without resale would give more revenue. If the cost function of the monopolist
is convex, then the monopolist can bene￿t from selling to low value consumers and
letting them to sell to high value consumers. Therefore, the model with resale would
give more revenue.
2 Economic Environment
Consider a monopolist and two consumers, where the monopolist does not know how
much the consumers are willing to pay for the good. Suppose that consumers￿pref-
erences depend on the preference characteristics ￿: The characteristics ￿ are private
information to the consumers. The monopolist and the other consumer only know





that F satis￿es Myerson￿ s (1981) regularity condition.2 The consumers￿preferences
are represented by the utility function
u(￿) = ￿v (q) ￿ T;
where q is the number of units consumed, and T is the total amount paid. The
monopolist￿ s production cost is given by the function c(q): The monopoly pro￿t
from selling q units against a sum of money T is then given by
￿ = T ￿ c(q):
This paper considers the question of ￿nding the pro￿t maximizing pair (T;q) that
the monopolist will be able to induce the consumers to choose, in an environment
in which the consumers can resell some or all of the good that they have to each
other. We suppose that resale takes place in an imperfect information setting. That
is, no information about the values or actions taken in the ￿rst stage (buying from
the monopolist stage) are revealed before the second stage (reselling to each other
stage.) We consider no discounting of payo⁄s between the two stages.
In the resale stage, one of the bidders is chosen randomly￿ with :5 probability￿ as
a proposer and the other is the responder. The proposer o⁄ers an optimal menu to
the responder. This menu can have both buy and sell o⁄ers. We restrict analysis to
direct revelation mechanisms which are truthful in both stages.





[T (￿1) + T (￿2) ￿ c(q (￿1) + q (￿2))]dF (￿1)dF (￿2)
subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints of the con-
sumers. These constraints are determined with considering the resale stage as well.
2That is, the virtual value function ￿ ￿
1￿F(￿)
f(￿) is increasing. This assumption is fairly common
in nonlinear pricing literature.
3We suppose that the monopolist treats the consumers symmetrically.
33 Linear Cost, Concave Utility Case
In this section, we suppose that the monopolist￿ s production cost is linear and given
by c(q) = cq with the unit cost c > 0: Hence, monopolist￿ s pro￿t from selling q units
against a sum of money T is given by
￿ = T ￿ cq:
Moreover, we suppose that consumers￿preferences are represented by the utility
function which is concave in units consumed. Speci￿cally,
u(￿) = ￿v (q) ￿ T;
where v satis￿es v (0) = 0; v0 (0) = 1, and v0 (q) > 0, v00 (q) < 0 for all q:
We work backwards as usual. Given the menu o⁄ered by the monopolist, the
consumers will behave optimally in the resale stage.
3.1 Behavior in the resale stage
Since the consumers￿choices fT (￿i);q (￿i)g are their private information in the second
stage, the consumers will o⁄er each other menus with imperfect information. Let us
consider bidder 1 (bidder 2￿ s problem is exactly the same.) Consider the consumer
1 with preference parameter ￿1; who announces his type as ￿
0
1 in the ￿rst stage and
gets q (￿
0
1) units of the product at the price of T (￿
0
1).
In the second stage, when bidder 1 is chosen to be the proposer, he will o⁄er




1)g to consumer 2 where r denotes the amount of
the good transferred from 2 and S denotes the amount of the money transferred to









1) + r(￿2)) ￿ S (￿2)]dF (￿2)




￿2v (q (￿2) ￿ r(￿2)) + S (￿2) ￿ ￿2v (q (￿2))
and
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1 = ￿1; then ￿
00
1 above should be also equal to ￿1 and when ￿
00
1 = ￿1, it gives a
value not less than 0:























[T (￿) ￿ cq (￿)]dF (￿)
subject to






(IC) U (￿;￿) ￿ U (￿;￿










0) ￿ T (￿
0) is maximized at ￿
0 = ￿:
Using envelope theorem (v0 (0) = 1 makes sure that solution for the maximization
problem has an interior solution and we can treat r and S as constant while di⁄er-
entiating with respect to ￿
0), we obtain the following FOC (let us denote r(￿
0 j ￿;￿)
by r(￿
0 j ￿) and S (￿
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0 j ￿) ￿ S (￿ j ￿
0)]dF (￿
0)
￿ ￿m(￿) + l(￿)
Since the transfers between the bidders add up to zero, we have
Z ￿
￿
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1 ￿ F (￿)
f (￿)
￿
m(￿)dF (￿) ￿ U (￿)







1 ￿ F (￿)
f (￿)
￿
m(￿) ￿ cq (￿)
￿
dF (￿) ￿ U (￿) (2)
3.3 Characterization of S, r and m
Let us consider a proposer with type e ￿ who announced his type as e ￿ in the ￿rst stage.
















(IC2) Y (￿) ￿ Y (￿;￿








0) = ￿v (q (￿
0) ￿ r(￿
0)) + S (￿
0)
and Y (￿) = Y (￿;￿):
IC2 constraint implies the following ￿rst-order condition:
S
0 (￿) + ￿q
0 (￿)v
0 (q (￿) ￿ r(￿)) ￿ ￿r
0 (￿)v
0 (q (￿) ￿ r(￿)) = 0
Hence, we obtain
Y


























0 ￿ ￿v (q (￿) ￿ r(￿))
￿
dF (￿) + Y (￿)
and by integration by parts, we obtain
Z ￿
￿




1 ￿ F (￿)
f (￿)
k (￿) ￿ ￿v (q (￿) ￿ r(￿))
￿
dF (￿) + Y (￿)






e ￿v(q(e ￿) + r(￿)) +
￿
￿ ￿
1 ￿ F (￿)
f (￿)
￿
v (q (￿) ￿ r(￿))
￿
dF (￿) ￿ Y (￿)
The ￿rst order condition is
e ￿v
0(q(e ￿) + r(￿)) ￿
￿
￿ ￿




0 (q (￿) ￿ r(￿)) = 0
73.4 Revenue Superiority of Without Resale Model






[T (￿) ￿ cq (￿)]dF (￿)
subject to IR and IC constraints￿ of course, di⁄erent constraints in two models.
Given a menu in with resale model, (T;q) the consumers will behave optimally
and choose optimal (S;r)
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1
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(v (q (￿) + r(￿
0 j ￿)) + v (q (￿) ￿ r(￿ j ￿
0)))dF (￿
0) = e v (￿)
Consider a consumer with type ￿: Since behaving as if his value is ￿
0 in both stages
would give less payo⁄than behaving as if his value is ￿
0 in the ￿rst stage and behaving
optimally in the second stage, the IC constraint of the model with resale is not less
restricted than the following constraint:
￿e v (￿) ￿ e T (￿) ￿ ￿e v (￿
0) ￿ e T (￿





and IR constraint is given by





Consider the optimal menu of the monopolist in the model with resale fT R;qRg
and corresponding fe T R; e qR;e vRg. We will argue below that without resale, the mo-
nopolist can make a bigger pro￿t.








which implies that there is some b q (￿) ￿ e q (￿) with
v (b q (￿)) = e v
R (￿):
Now, we claim that monopoly without resale would give a higher revenue than
monopoly with resale. The monopolist can obtain a higher revenue by o⁄ering the






































￿v (b q (￿)) ￿ e T
R (￿) ￿ ￿v (b q (￿
0)) ￿ e T
R (￿
0)
￿v (b q (￿)) ￿ e T
R (￿) ￿ 0
Therefore, the menu fb q; e T Rg satis￿es IC and IR constraints of the without resale
problem, and it gives a revenue bigger than the optimal revenue of the with resale
model. The inequality is strict unless for any given ￿; q (￿) + 1
2r(￿
0 j ￿) ￿ 1
2r(￿ j ￿
0)
is the same for all ￿
0 (otherwise Jensen￿ s inequality would give a strict inequality.)
Since this would not be true generically, we can conclude that without resale model
is revenue superior to with resale model. We hence obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If the monopolist has a constant marginal cost, and the consumers
have concave utility functions, then the maximal revenue achievable in an environment
with resale is less than the maximal revenue achievable in an environment without
resale.
4 Convex Cost, Linear Utility Case
In this section, we suppose that consumers￿preferences are linear in units consumed,
and represented by the utility function
u(￿) = ￿q ￿ T
Assuming that the monopolist￿ s production cost is given by the convex function
c(q) with c(0) = 0; c0 (q) > 0 and c00 (q) > 0 for all q; his pro￿t from selling q units
against a sum of money T is then given by
￿ = T ￿ c(q)
9We consider the question of ￿nding the pro￿t maximizing pair (T;q) that the
monopolist will be able to induce the consumers to choose. We ￿nd the optimal
menu for both without resale case and with resale case4.
4.1 Optimal menu without resale







[T (￿1) + T (￿2) ￿ c(q (￿1) + q (￿2))]dF (￿1)dF (￿2)
subject to
(IR) u(￿) ￿ ￿q (￿) ￿ T (￿) ￿ 0
and
(IC) ￿q (￿) ￿ T (￿) ￿ ￿q (￿
0) ￿ T (￿
0):
IC constraint implies the following ￿rst-order condition:
T
0 (￿) ￿ ￿q
0 (￿) = 0 (3)
We then obtain
u
0 (￿) = q (￿)










By using standard techniques we obtain
Z ￿
￿


















1 ￿ F (￿)
f (￿)
￿





c(q (￿1) + q (￿2))dF (￿1)dF (￿2)
#
4The solution for without resale case for this model was not given in the literature for two
consumers case.
104.2 Optimal menu with resale
We work backwards as usual. Given the menu o⁄ered by the monopolist, the con-
sumers will behave optimally in the resale stage.
4.2.1 Behavior in the resale stage
Consider the consumer 1 with preference parameter ￿1; who announces his type as
￿
0
1 in the ￿rst stage and gets q (￿
0
1) units of the product at the price of T (￿
0
1). In
the second stage, when bidder 1 is chosen to be the proposer, he will o⁄er a menu to
consumer 2. It can be shown that the optimal menu of is setting two prices ps (￿1)
and pb (￿1) such that ps (￿1) maximizes
q (￿
0
1)(1 ￿ F (ps))(ps ￿ ￿1)
and pb (￿1) maximizes Z pb
0
q (￿2)(￿1 ￿ pb)dF (￿2):





















Thus, bidder 1￿ s overall payo⁄ is
u(￿1;￿
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q (￿2)(￿1 ￿ ps (￿2))dF (￿2) = g (￿1)
With this new notation, a bidder with value ￿ who announces his type as ￿
0 in
the ￿rst stage achieves a payo⁄
u(￿;￿
0) = q (￿






















c(q (￿1) + q (￿2))f (￿1)f (￿2)d￿1d￿2
subject to
(IR) u(￿) ￿ u(￿;￿) ￿ 0
and
(IC) u(￿) ￿ u(￿;￿
0):
IC can be written as
h(￿)q (￿) ￿ T (￿) ￿ h(￿)q (￿
0) ￿ T (￿
0):
IC constraint implies the following ￿rst-order condition:
T
0 (￿) ￿ h(￿)q
0 (￿) = 0





0 (￿)d￿ + T (￿)




0 (￿)q (￿)d￿ + T (￿)




0 (￿)q (￿)d￿ + g (￿) ￿ u(￿)
Since at the optimal menu, we should have u(￿) = 0; and (by the standard
techniques) and also g (￿) = 0;
Z ￿
￿
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0 (￿) = h(￿) ￿
1 ￿ F (￿)
f (￿)
F (p(￿)) ￿ ’(￿)
















0 (￿) ￿ 0
The constraint q0 (￿) ￿ 0 will hold as long as ’(￿) is nondecreasing.
4.3 Revenue Superiority of With Resale Model














N0 (￿)d￿ + T
N (￿)
Since h(￿) > ￿; we conclude that for the revenue maximizing qN in without resale
model, we could ￿nd a e T R which is greater than T N so that the menu fqN; e T Rg would
give more revenue in with resale model. We hence obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the monopolist has a convex cost function, and the consumers have
linear utility functions, then the maximal revenue achievable in an environment with
resale is more than the maximal revenue achievable in an environment without resale.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have found conditions for the optimal mechanisms for a monopolist
who expects that consumers would resell in a secondary market. Abstaining from
the possible disclosure policy of the monopolist, we focused on the nonlinear pricing
13menus that the monopolist would be able to implement. We have worked on the con-
tinuous distributions of the values of the consumers, which has never done before for
the monopoly with resale problem. We have shown that the pro￿tability of banning
the resale depends on the speci￿cs of the environment.
This paper shows that resale opportunities signi￿cantly e⁄ects the optimal menu
of the monopolist and the textbook result ￿resale is harmful for the monopolist￿is
not always correct. Solving for the optimal menu of the monopolist with resale is yet
to be done.
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